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Abstract 
The rapidly growing transdisciplinary enthusiasm about developing new kinds of 
Anthropocene stories is based on the shared assumption that the Anthropocene 
predicament is best made sense of by narrative means. Against this assumption, 
this article argues that the challenge we are facing today does not merely lie in 
telling either scientific, socio-political, or entangled Anthropocene narratives to 
come to terms with our current condition. Instead, the challenge lies in coming to 
grips with how the stories we can tell in the Anthropocene relate to the radical 
novelty of the Anthropocene condition about which no stories can be told. What 
we need to find are meaningful ways to reconcile an inherited commitment to 
narrativization and the collapse of storytelling as a vehicle of understanding the 
Anthropocene as our current predicament. 
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The Many Stories of the Anthropocene 
What kinds of stories does the Anthropocene challenge us to tell? Historians, 
social scientists, and literary scholars seem just as eager to answer this question 
today as earth scientists, geologists, and human geographers do. The answers 
themselves may be discipline-specific, and, among many other factors, largely 
vary along how one defines the Anthropocene and what one considers to be the 
beginning of the story.1 Stories that understand the Anthropocene as a geological 
epoch or stories that regard the notion as being integral to the relatively new 
knowledge formation known as Earth system science may take radically different 
twists and turns than stories that refer to a cultural condition or to a general 
human imprint on nature. Besides, a story based on stratigraphic data (Zalasiewicz 
et al., 2011), a story about biodiversity loss (Seddon et al., 2016), and a story that 
revolves around the mischiefs and wrongdoings of the central villain named 
capitalism (Moore, 2015), may not even have much in common. 
 I will come back to the question of differences soon. For now, the more 
important thing to note is that talking about the Anthropocene as a geological 
epoch-marker with a beginning makes sense only against the backdrop of an 
implied story. No wonder that the humanities and the social sciences – and lately 
especially the discipline of history – have found their way to join the discussion 
initiated by the natural sciences. Despite the large variety of approaches to 
Anthropocene narratives, a shared sense has already been developed that the most 
plausible stories should somehow feature multiple timescales – from 
industrialization processes to planetary histories – and achieve a transdisciplinary 
character by bringing most of the above concerns and elements together. Such an 
expectation has already been present in Paul Crutzen’s brief essay in Nature, which 
kick-started the spectacular career of the term at the beginning of the new 
millennium. In suggesting the eighteenth century as the onset of the 
Anthropocene, Crutzen (2002: 23) referred to ‘analyses of air trapped in polar ice’ 
that ‘showed the beginning of growing global concentrations of carbon dioxide 
and methane’ in this period, and also noted that this data ‘happens to coincide 
with James Watt’s design of the steam engine in 1784’. 
 Noting a coincidence between possible Anthropocene stories told by the 
natural sciences on the one hand and the humanities and social sciences on the 
other does not, however, put the respective stories into any meaningful relation to 
each other. The same applies to the ‘Great Acceleration’ thesis, which sets the 
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beginning of the Anthropocene in the early postwar years. The thesis works from 
an Earth system science point of view, which brings together various disciplines 
of the natural sciences in considering the Earth as a whole, an integrated system 
on its own. The term ‘Great Acceleration’ refers to a simultaneous postwar 
runaway of socio-economic trends (including urban population, water use, GDP, 
or transportation) and Earth system indicators (such as stratospheric ozone, ocean 
acidification, shrimp aquaculture, or terrestrial biosphere degradation). Although 
its advocates are aware of the fact that ‘correlation in time does not prove cause-
and-effect’, they think that ‘there is a vast amount of evidence that the changes 
and in the structure and functioning of the Earth System […] are primarily driven 
by human activities’ (Steffen et al, 2015: 92). 
 But even if the cause-and-effect relationship between histories of the human 
world and histories of the Earth system could be established, from the viewpoint 
of the humanities and social sciences this would typically result in rather 
unsophisticated narratives. It would still be the standard Earth story, the latest 
episode of which features human beings as new geological agents. Needless to 
say, according to much of humanities and social sciences criticism, this actually is 
the paradigmatic Anthropocene story as told by the natural sciences. Critics point 
out that even though the natural sciences have done an invaluable service in 
calling attention to human-induced changes in the Earth system and their 
potential consequences, the social embeddedness of the supposedly universal 
humanity that features as the novel geological agent in Anthropocene narratives 
of the Earth system should receive just as much attention. 
Going back to Crutzen’s temporal coincidence between what stratigraphic 
data shows and Watt’s steam engine, Andreas Malm and Alf Hornborg (2014: 92) 
tell a completely different story, in which ‘capitalists in a small corner of a the 
Western world invested in steam, laying the foundation stone for fossil economy’. 
In offering a brief sketch of the history of this fossil economy, they emphasize the 
responsibility of ‘advanced capitalist countries’ in bringing about the current 
situation. Malm and Hornborg (2014: 64) note that ‘in the early 21st century, the 
poorest 45% of the human population accounted for 7% of emissions, while the 
richest 7% produced 50%’ and go on to ask the rhetorical question: ‘Are these basic 
facts reconcilable with a view of humankind as the new geological agent?’ 
Eventually, Malm and Hornborg (2014: 66) end up claiming that the 
standard natural scientific Anthropocene story represents ‘an illogical and 
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ultimately self-defeating foray of the natural sciences – responsible for the original 
discovery of climate change – into the domain of human affairs’, and that ‘in 
Anthropocene thinking, natural scientists extend their world views to society’. 
And they are not the only ones to think so. The recent book of historians 
Christophe Bonneuil and Jean-Baptiste Fressoz, The Shock of the Anthropocene (the 
2016 translation of the French book originally published in 2013), rhymes off these 
sentiments, depicting the same scientific Anthropocene narrative as if it conveyed 
the hidden agenda of science aspiring world governance. Although Bonneuil and 
Fressoz start out by crediting the sciences of doing a great job at recognizing and 
establishing the situation to face, they accuse natural sciences with a 
depoliticization of very situation they describe. They think that there is one 
‘official’ Anthropocene narrative out there that must be bitterly countered, and 
that a proper understanding of the Anthropocene must be based on historical 
Anthropocene narratives that tell how a differentiated human world arrived at the 
present situation. 
There are nevertheless good arguments indicating that this kind of 
animosity, just as well as the idea that scientific Anthropocene stories wish to 
intrude and overtake the way we think about the human world, is unjustified and 
misplaced. First, if anything, such stories seem to be either of the completely 
opposite effect or of the implausibility to think about nature and the human world 
in terms of one dominating the other. What they are trying to convince us about 
is not that we should look at the human world ‘scientifically’, but that this human 
world – with all that comes with it – is now irreversibly acting into and 
transforming the order of nature, compelling us to redefine the way we think 
about the relationship between nature and the human world as intertwined.2 
What is more, most scientific Anthropocene narratives entail a kind of 
anthropocentrism manifested in the acknowledgement of the unprecedented 
powers of human beings in transforming the Earth system. Even if they abandon 
the idea of human exceptionalism by collapsing a strict conceptual separation 
between nature and the human world, what they are often being criticized by the 
emerging discourses of anti-anthropocentric critical posthumanism and ecological 
humanities of human-nonhuman kinship (Braidotti, 2013; Haraway, 2016) is 
precisely their anthropocentrism. 
Second, as Julia Adeney Thomas (2018: 177) notes, scientific Anthropocene 
stories and ‘ESS [Earth system science] scientists are not in the business of blame’. 
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Dipesh Chakrabarty (2017: 28) makes the same point when claiming that the 
notion of the Anthropocene as emerged in the natural sciences ‘refers more to 
(mostly human-driven) changes to the Earth system as a whole and less about 
moral culpability of humans (or some humans) in causing them’. Finally, in his 
recent book, Defiant Earth: The Fate of Humans in the Anthropocene (2017), Clive 
Hamilton even provides an explanation for the confusion in arguing that the 
Anthropocene represents a paradigm shift inseparable from the new-born Earth 
System science. In Hamilton’s view, it is within this new knowledge formation – 
which may indeed be new in the sense of emerging in the broadly construed 
postwar period – that the Anthropocene has been conceived as a novel 
understanding of humanity’s role in the equally novel conception of the Earth as 
an integral system. The problem with the understanding of the situation by much 
of humanities and social sciences scholarship is, accordingly, that they ‘read the 
Anthropocene into the old disciplines with which they are comfortable’ 
(Hamilton, 2017: 20). 
I think that these latter remarks raise a valid point. Many interventions into 
what is conceived of as a monumental Anthropocene story of the natural sciences 
oftentimes result in nonetheless standard evocations of what, by now, appears as 
a rather conventional and predictable critical arsenal of humanities and social 
sciences scholarship. Motivated by the anxiety that scientific Anthropocene stories 
erase their categories of understanding out of the picture, humanities and social 
science engagements with the Anthropocene can easily be just as reductionist and 
one-sided as, in their view, natural scientific Anthropocene narratives are. While 
claiming to balance the overall picture, often they gesture toward the other 
extreme pole. 
Such sense of mutual exclusivity derives from the assumption that telling 
one kind of Anthropocene story may render other kinds impossible to tell. In turn, 
the assumption that different kinds of Anthropocene narratives anaesthetize (at 
best) or inactivate (at worst) each other is based on the deeper conviction that these 
stories are about the same thing, and that the plausibility of one kind of narrative 
must come at the expense of the plausibility of other kinds. Contrary to this, it 
seems to me that scientific Anthropocene narratives on the one hand and socio-
political ones on the other are typically about different things. They are simply 
based on conflicting imperatives. Whereas scientific Anthropocene narratives 
demand preemptive action in facing an existential risk, the narratives of the 
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humanities and social sciences typically demand social justice and entail proactive 
social engagement (Simon 2017). The latter demand is hardly intelligible in case of 
a story which – as indicated by the above arguments of Thomas, Chakrabarty, and 
Hamilton – features the Earth system as its central character and as a subject of 
change. The demand for social justice underlying socio-political Anthropocene 
stories concerns a subject other than the Earth system. It wishes to introduce 
changes in the condition of a socio-politically deprived subject of the human 
world. 
 More on this later. At this point, the question that has to be asked goes as 
follows: where does all this leave us? Does this mean the expectation of 
transdisciplinarity concerning the most plausible Anthropocene stories is out of 
the question? The countless calls (Castree et al., 2014; Thomas, 2014; Clark and 
Gunaratam, 2017; Toivanen et al., 2017; Robin, 2018) for joined investigations to 
find meaningful ways to relate stories of the Earth system and narratives of a 
socio-politically divided human world most certainly suggests otherwise. Can it 
be then that all calls, pleas, and efforts of making sense by crafting entangled 
Anthropocene narratives, testify a possibility and a necessity, but, at the same 
time, are nevertheless misplaced in one way or another? Well, this may be closer 
to the point I would like to make, although it still sounds a bit too harsh. I firmly 
believe that we can tell stories in the Anthropocene and such stories may be novel 
kinds. What I think we cannot tell are stories about the Anthropocene. The former 
means that we can tell entangled and truly transdisciplinary stories of how the 
current condition came about and what factors contributed to arriving at this 
point. Yet such stories do not permit a better understanding of the condition, that 
is, the Anthropocene predicament itself. 
In the coming pages, I argue that the challenge we face today does not 
merely lie in developing either scientific, socio-political, or entangled 
Anthropocene stories to come to terms with our current condition. Instead, the 
challenge lies in coming to grips with how the stories we can (but not necessarily 
should) tell in the Anthropocene relate to the radical novelty of the Anthropocene 
condition about which no stories can be told. What we need is to find meaningful 
ways to reconcile what apparently is a retained commitment to narrative 
understanding with the collapse of storytelling as a vehicle of comprehending the 
Anthropocene as our current predicament. 
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I try to render this claim plausible in four consecutive steps. I begin with a 
brief overview of narrative understanding as associated with historical 
understanding. Then, in the second step, I indicate both the retained necessity and 
the shortcomings of storytelling by engaging with Dipesh Chakrabarty’s most 
inspiring efforts to bring together stories of nature and the human world. As a 
third step, I elaborate on the other side of the equation: the Anthropocene as 
radical novelty, as rupture, as shock, and as unprecedented change. Finally, in the 
concluding step I contend that although the narrative domestication of such 
radical novelty may be necessary, it is not necessarily the kind of understanding 
and the kind of politics required for coming to terms with the Anthropocene 
predicament. 
 
 
Narrative Understanding and the Anthropocene 
Telling Anthropocene stories is, so to say, only half of the story. To come to a 
proper understanding of our current condition, we need to explore the extent to 
which the Anthropocene renders storytelling impossible. Such a recognition of the 
limits of understanding and sense-making by means of storytelling could yield to 
a twofold benefit. On the one hand, it would open the way for developing new 
ways of understanding specifically tailored to the novelty of the predicament 
itself. On the other, probing the boundaries of storytelling would be the most 
instrumental precisely in finding out what kinds of Anthropocene narratives are 
still possible to tell.  
 All this may sound odd, I reckon. Do not we have history as the paradigmatic 
narrative discipline in the scholarly world, endowed with the potential to craft 
elaborated Anthropocene stories to the satisfaction of everyone? Philosophers of 
history and theoretically minded historians have answered the question of 
narrative affirmatively in the last more than half-century. In one way or another, 
the major theoretical approaches to history after the Second World War converged 
in their understanding of history as a narrative enterprise. From the 1950s 
onwards, analytic philosophers have begun to argue that historical descriptions 
of events presuppose a narrative organization (Danto, 1985 [1965]); that narrative 
is self-explanatory (Gallie, 1964); or that it is a cognitive instrument (Mink, 1987). 
Yet what most historians and theorists associate (even today) with a broadly 
construed narrativist position is rather Hayden White’s more literary theory-
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inspired approach to historical narrative as a subgenre of literary writing and a 
culturally sanctioned mode of meaning-making. It was White’s seminal 
Metahistory (1973), and perhaps even more his collections of essays (White, 1978; 
1987), which provoked oftentimes heated responses within the discipline of 
history in the 1990s.3 At the same time, Frank Ankersmit (1983; 1994) developed 
his own influential version of narrativism; phenomenologists extended the 
narrativist view to the human experience of time (Ricœur, 1984–1988; Carr, 1986); 
and narrative has become a cross-disciplinary fascination as a general way of 
making sense of the world and ourselves (Meretoja, 2014). 
This tiny sample of a far larger body of work is necessarily selective. As an 
assemblage of positions on the question of the role of narrative in history, it is 
nevertheless indicative enough concerning the dominance of the theoretical 
understanding of the historical enterprise as a narrative one in the second half of 
the last century (while the theoretical field moves towards other kinds of concerns 
since then).4 But narrative as a vehicle of historical understanding has not been 
merely a fancy of a handful of theorists and theoretically inclined historians. As 
the latest version of the American Historical Association’s ‘Statement on 
Standards of Professional Conduct’ (2018) clearly indicates, it is simply part of the 
professional code of historical studies. According to the statement, ‘we all 
interpret and narrate the past, which is to say that we all participate in making 
history. It is among our most fundamental tools for understanding ourselves and 
the world around us.’ Besides, the ‘shared values for conducting and assessing 
research, developing and evaluating interpretations, communicating new 
knowledge, navigating ethical dilemmas, and, not least, telling stories about the 
past, define the professional practice of history’.5 
Given all this, no wonder that Bonneuil and Fressoz approach the 
Anthropocene by trying to fulfil the role of storytellers. First, they want to 
deconstruct what they see as the ‘Geocratic Grand Narrative of the Anthropocene’ 
told by the natural sciences (Bonneuil and Fressoz, 2016: 45–96). Then, instead of 
such a monolithic narrative, Bonneuil and Fressoz (2016: 289) suggest that making 
sense of ‘what happened to us’ means ‘producing multiple, debatable and 
polemical narratives rather than a single hegemonic narrative that is supposedly 
apolitical’. Although the claim concerning the existence of one ‘single hegemonic’ 
natural scientific Anthropocene story (and that it is apolitical) is debatable,6 my 
intention here is only to call attention to their narrative approach. This is what 
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they need to be credited for as this is what they truly excel at. They propose no 
less than seven imaginatively entitled alternative narratives, such as the 
Thermocene (which they offer as a political history of CO2) or the Phagocene (a 
story of increasing commodification).  
The felt need of crafting Anthropocene narratives is nevertheless not 
confined to historical studies. It crosses every possible disciplinary boundaries, 
and, according to Bruno Latour, there are good reasons for that. With the Earth 
becoming ‘a full-fledged actor’, he does not think with Bonneuil and Fressoz that 
what we need are multiple stories. Instead, Latour (2014: 15) makes the case for 
the necessity of a convergence of possible stories, bringing together human and 
non-human actors in what he refers to as ‘our common geostory’, which should 
somehow feature all agents from plate tectonics and microbes to novelists and 
politicians. What nevertheless brings this to a shared platform with Bonneuil and 
Fressoz is the way Latour (2014: 5) thinks that ‘the problem for all of us in 
philosophy, science, or literature becomes: how do we tell such a story?’ 
 
 
Larger Scale, Same Kind of Story 
Indeed, how do we tell such a story? Back to historical studies, Dipesh 
Chakrabarty tries to answer the question in the most stimulating and thoughtful 
way. Since pioneering into the theme of what the Anthropocene demands from 
historical thinking in the article ‘The Climate of History’ (2009), Chakrabarty is 
engaged in mapping the possibility of Anthropocene narratives on a level that 
constitutes the shared fundament of both a Latourian common geostory and the 
multiple polemical narratives of Bonneuil and Fressoz: to develop a conceptual 
apparatus that could enable us to conceive of human history and Earth history as 
entangled. 
Accordingly, there hardly is a more elaborate endeavor to indicate the 
qualities, features, potential merits and shortcoming of Anthropocene narratives 
than Chakrabarty’s decade-long engagement. It boils down to a series of 
conceptual distinctions regarding the scale, the central characters, the underlying 
temporalities, and the implied worldviews of entangled Anthropocene stories. 
The distinctions are heavily interrelated and Chakrabarty tends to revisit and 
constantly elaborate on them. The entry point of a brief introduction to such a 
complex endeavor might just as well be the question of scale, being the most easily 
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distinguishable. Chakrabarty (2014: 1) claims that our current predicament is 
marked by the collision of three histories, ‘normally’ treated ‘as processes separate 
from one another for all practical purposes: the history of the earth system, the 
history of life including that of human evolution on the planet, and the more recent 
history of industrial civilization (for many, capitalism)’. 
Putting these histories into a meaningful relationship needs central 
characters, but these protagonists do not necessarily overlap scales in the sense 
that one central character could be attributed to each. They rather cut across the 
scales. In the above tripartite division, the history of industrial civilization or 
capitalism and the history of life jointly represent the world of human or human-
related affairs, and the history of Earth system is the story of nature. In the former 
two scales, the main character is an internally divided humanity. Whereas the 
story of capitalism plays out the extent to which intra-human inequalities are 
effective, in the story of humanity (to which Chakrabarty often refers to as world 
history) the central character is not divided into rich and poor. There is, however, 
‘the history of population’, which ‘belongs to two histories at once’: on the one 
hand, there is ‘the very short-term history of the industrial way of life’, and, on the 
other, there is the ‘longer-term evolutionary or deep history of our species, the 
history through which we have evolved to be the dominant species of the planet’, 
and ‘the poor participate in that shared history of human evolution just as much 
as the rich do’ (Chakrabarty, 2014: 14). 
Seen together, the story of capitalism in which the rich are the most effective 
is intertwined with the story of human evolution featuring the protagonist called 
‘species’, while, in the words of Chakrabarty (2014:15), ‘population is clearly a 
category that joins the two histories’. But what about the history of the Earth 
system? Its protagonist, Chakrabarty (2018: 25) claims, is ‘the Earth system itself, 
not humans’, and the Earth system story itself belongs to ‘the time of geology, vast 
and incomprehensible in terms of the concerns of human history’. At the same 
time, however, once humans appear in the story, ‘geological time gets written over 
by the human time of world history, and humans emerge as the subject of the 
drama of the Anthropocene, not just in the writings of scholars in the human 
sciences but often in those of earth scientists themselves’ (Chakrabarty, 2018: 25). 
The latter move constitutes ‘the moral side of the Anthropocene debate’, 
involving a necessary act of displacement, that is, the translation of ‘ideas that 
have deeply to do with Earth history, geology, and geological time into the 
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language of world history’ (Chakrabarty, 2018: 9). But this translation works in the 
opposite direction too. For the human that enters geological time is not simply the 
human of the historical time of world history. In his Tanner Lectures in Human 
Values, Chakrabarty (2015: 173–174) distinguishes between two understandings 
of the human as homo and anthropos. Whereas the former denotes ‘humanity as a 
divided political subject’, the anthropos refers to the ‘collective and unintended 
forms of existence of the human, as a geological force, as a species, as part of the 
history of life on this planet’. Chakrabarty (2015: 154–165, 167–173) even widens 
this distinction into homocentric and zoecentric views of the world, which 
respectively account for histories revolving around humans understood in socio-
political terms and histories in which humans are conceived of within a larger 
scheme of life (zoe). Eventually, it is the anthropos of a zoecentric worldview which, 
according to Chakrabarty (2015: 174), ‘decenters the human by subordinating 
human history to geological and evolutionary histories of the planet’.7 
The above distinctions do not necessarily overlap. Some of them even seem 
to conflict. It is not clear, for instance, whether a distinction between worldviews 
which results in the absorption of smaller scale histories by deeper histories 
amounts to a genuine entanglement of those histories or rather requires the ability 
to constantly shift between the worldviews and their respectively implied 
histories. Chakrabarty’s intention to create the conceptual possibility of bringing 
together stories of different scales, main characters, temporalities, and worldviews 
in a deep processual Anthropocene narrative is nevertheless clear. Needless to say, 
this amounts to a major and, to my mind, unparalleled achievement. But it is not 
without shortcomings. 
Already in his initial engagement with the Anthropocene, Chakrabarty 
(2009: 197, 220) phrased the main challenge as the collapse of historical 
understanding in facing an extreme Anthropocene prospect of a ‘world without 
us’ that defies the ‘continuity of human experience’. Since then, his work has been 
focused on the extent to which the monumental scale of Anthropocene narratives 
escapes the confines of human experience. At the same time, he remained relatively 
silent about the extent to which the continuity of such experience is threatened. 
Differently put, the attention Chakrabarty is paying to question of how to tell 
stories about that which cannot be experienced by human beings as human beings 
(a species history of the anthropos, a zoecentric view, geological time) is 
accompanied by an inattention toward that which defies the continuity 
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underlying all stories, regardless of whether their scale is human or larger-than-
human. 
 The storytelling of continuous unfolding retains the idea of modern Western 
historicity that change over time in human affairs is best conceived of as 
processual and developmental. Historical understanding and modern historical 
time underlies Anthropocene narratives of all scales. And there is not much 
surprise in this. For there is at least one crucial aspect in which there has been no 
divide between nature and the human world that only the Anthropocene could 
have collapsed lately. It can very well be that, as Bonneuil and Fressoz (2016: 37) 
point out, history as we know it in its professionalized and institutionalized form 
has concerned human affairs and ‘it could scarcely interact with the history of 
nature, the timescales being different’. But the question of scale is only one 
indicator, far from being the primary. On a deeper level, Western modernity has 
connected the human and the natural world when it has begun to conceive of both 
as ‘historical’ by virtue of seeing them in terms of a developmental process. 
According to Maurice Mandelbaum’s study of nineteenth-century thought (1971: 
77–111), evolutionary thinking about the natural world emerged as the equivalent 
of the historicist developmental view of the human world, both accounting for 
their investigated natural and social phenomena ‘historically’. Similarly, as 
Hannah Arendt (1961: 61) remarks, ‘the connection between concepts of nature 
and history’ was the idea of ‘process’, and the ‘key words of modern 
historiography – “development” and “progress” – were, in the nineteenth century, 
also the key words of the then new branches of natural science, particularly 
biology and geology, one dealing with animal life and the other even with non-
organic matter in terms of historical processes’. 
 Entangling natural scientific Anthropocene narratives and human histories 
goes relatively easily today precisely because modernity has already storied the 
natural and the human world along the same kind of processual changes. 
Questions of the diverging scales, the different paces, and multiple protagonists 
of change are the main difficulties to overcome for entangled Anthropocene 
stories. But these are, I think, only difficulties and thus are not constitutive of the 
more critical challenge. The most puzzling question today is not that of how to 
handle various scales, speeds, and actors of stories, all of which are constructed 
along a shared type of change, but that of how far we can go on in telling such 
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stories of processes when the Anthropocene confronts us with a type of perceived 
change that is anything but processual. 
 
 
Unprecedented Change, Rupture, Shock, Event 
The extent to which the Anthropocene resists processual narratives on all scales is 
the extent to which it defies, as Chakrabarty says, the continuity of human 
experience. Against the backdrop of such continuity, at its most extreme, the 
Anthropocene threatens to put an end to the human subject of entangled stories. 
Although potential human extinction scenarios entailed by radical Anthropocene 
scenarios – together with technological dystopias of singularity reached by 
designing greater-than-human intelligence and with visions of a nuclear holocaust 
– are often denounced as instances unjustified catastrophism, they represent a 
novel societal expectation of the future in which humanity authors its own 
disaster. As I argued elsewhere (Simon, 2015; 2018), these prospects of 
anthropogenic human extinction are constitutive of an emerging sense of 
historicity. Unlike the historical understanding of the modern period which 
conceives of change over time both in nature and society in terms of 
developmental processes, postwar Western societies configure change over time 
in these prospects as unprecedented change. Instead of unfolding from past states 
affairs, such a change brings about a disconnection between past states of affairs 
and a completely novel predicament by a suddenly erupting game-changer event. 
If the Anthropocene predicament includes such prospect of unprecedentedness as 
disconnection from the past without being restricted to it, then the question is how 
to reconcile this with our storytelling activity in which we manifest the continuity 
of our experience.   
The notion of unprecedented change is not the only conceptualization of 
the radical novelty of the Anthropocene predicament. The Anthropocene can be 
conceived of as resisting storytelling by means other than its future prospect and 
with respect to domains other than human affairs. Clive Hamilton’s 
conceptualization of the Anthropocene as rupture concerns the natural world and 
Earth history (Hamilton, 2017: 1–35). As mentioned earlier, Hamilton argues that 
the birth of Earth system science is a paradigm shift, and the Anthropocene is a 
notion that cannot be understood outside the paradigm within which it has been 
conceived. Although Hamilton only passingly references Thomas Kuhn’s book 
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The Structure of Scientific Revolutions as the source of his ideas on a recent paradigm 
shift, it seems important to point out that in the Kuhnian sense the new paradigm 
is incommensurable with old one it replaces. 
What does such incommensurability mean? The term literally refers to the 
lack of common measure, but the metaphorical description of Kuhn (1996 [1962]: 
150) suggests somewhat more when claiming that ‘proponents of competing 
paradigms practice their trades in different worlds’. Read together with the fact 
that Kuhn advocated the idea of paradigm shifts as seldom revolutionary events 
against the reigning understanding of the history of science as a cumulative 
process, the above characterization of a new paradigm’s relation to the old seems 
to entail a sense of historicity and a new understanding of change over time akin 
to the notion of unprecedented change. Conceiving of the Anthropocene as 
rupture brought about by a new paradigm means nothing other than seeing it as 
a predicament that does not arise out of a cumulative process. The effect is the 
same as in the case of unprecedented change: the new predicament, not being 
perceived as a product of a development, withstands the processual rendering of 
Anthropocene stories. 
Yet another indication of the perception of the Anthropocene as radical 
novelty is to talk about its shock, as in the title of Bonneuil and Fressoz’s book. The 
Shock of the Anthropocene can nevertheless be misleading in that the concept 
Bonneuil and Fressoz work with is that of the ‘event’ of the Anthropocene, which 
actually features in the original French title of the book (L’événement Anthropocène). 
But regardless of whether one talks about a shock or an event of the Anthropocene, 
it entails a distinct disruptive character attributed to an emerging overall 
condition. Accordingly, Bonneuil and Fressoz (2016: 19) do not hesitate to describe 
the situation in a dramatic tone, claiming that ‘the Anthropocene is an event, a 
point of bifurcation in the history of Earth, life and humans. It overturns our 
representations of the world’. Although these words claim radical novelty with 
respect both to our conceptions of nature and human affairs, and although 
‘bifurcation’ and the ‘overturning of our representations of the world’ imply a 
break between pre- and post-Anthropocene modes of thought, Bonneuil and 
Fressoz devote two-thirds of their book to their seven Anthropocene narratives, 
continuing to represent the world by the familiar means of processual historical 
narratives. The same applies to Hamilton. His arguments for the Anthropocene as 
rupture are undermined by a desire for ‘a new narrative of narratives’ (Hamilton 
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2017: 77), that is, an updated version of the old story of humanity (which of course 
Bonneuil and Fressoz would disapprove of): 
 
And so we gaze into a future of the progressive elimination of difference in a globalized world, 
coupled with the dawning of an Anthropocene that, over the next decades, must increasingly rule 
over everyday life and consciousness wherever one resides, opening up space for a world narrative 
and perhaps a philosophy of global history. Above all of the diversity stand one global economy, 
one global culture, one total Earth. The Anthropocene arrives as the grand narrative to 
progressively order and explain experience, the universal truth all humanity is obliged to live 
under, a narrative that, like it or not, subsumes all others and against which they will be judged. 
As it gathers pace the tyranny of the Earth System will overrule the plurality of local stories and 
cultures. If the Anthropocene performs this unexpected and unwelcome unification of humankind 
then it invites us to formulate a story of humankind, a narrative explanation of the progress of 
human history as a whole […]. (Hamilton, 2017: 84–85) 
 
There can hardly be a clearer indication of the intricacies and perplexities of the 
Anthropocene predicament than the fact that even those who claim the radical 
novelty of the Anthropocene cannot but have a recourse to inherited schemes in 
their efforts to make sense of it, thereby trivializing and domesticating their own 
insights. 
To avoid misunderstanding, my intention by pointing this out is merely to 
raise attention to what I think is the greatest challenge: making sense of that which 
appears to defy our familiar ways of sense-making. I not wish to pretend that I 
have a way out of this conceptual Catch-22, but, in the first place, we need to 
understand that we are in it: on the one hand, we tend to think of the Anthropocene as 
the radical event, rupture, and unprecedented change that rewrites disciplinary codes as 
we know them and demands new arrangements of knowledge we are yet to establish; on 
the other, we still think about our radically new predicament in terms of our more familiar 
arrangements of knowledge and keep on telling processual narratives about the 
Anthropocene (just as we did about practically anything in the modern period). 
This, I believe, is the fundamental paradox of our current understanding of 
the Anthropocene. Regardless of whether one wants to tell a single grand 
narrative on the planetary scale as Hamilton does, multiple and polemical stories 
as Bonneuil and Fressoz advocate, or an entangled story of timescales, central 
characters and worldviews as Chakrabarty suggests, the sheer act of telling 
Anthropocene narratives is in conflict with the necessity of recognizing the 
novelty of the situation. Accordingly, what we need to come to terms with is the 
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question of whether such potentially contradictory imperatives are constitutive of 
the very same predicament. In place of conclusion, a quick look at the politics of 
storytelling as the domestication of novelty may be the first step towards 
developing an answer to this question. 
 
 
A Politics for the Anthropocene 
The single most important contention of narrativism for recent efforts to 
understand the Anthropocene predicament is that the stories we tell domesticate 
that which they are about. Hayden White (1978: 256), in an essay on Foucault, calls 
the operation of rendering the strange familiar ‘the essentially domesticating effect 
of all historical writing’. Besides, according to another essay of White (1987: 58–
82), this domesticating effect constitutes the ‘politics of historical interpretation’. 
The Anthropocene predicament is of course completely alien to White’s work. I 
do not want to suggest that White’s views within either an aesthetic context or in 
the context of Foucault’s attack on the ‘historical’ search for origins can 
unproblematically transferred into our context. But even if the Anthropocene is 
not merely something ‘strange’ that stories render familiar, it is certainly 
something unfamiliar that narratives familiarize. It is perceived radical novelty 
domesticated by storytelling. 
The domesticating function of narrative attains a new and critical political 
dimension in the Anthropocene situation in which societal action is called for 
preventing future catastrophe. The more such perceived radical novelty is 
domesticated, the less radical and the less novel it appears, and thus the less it 
calls for mitigation. Domestication smooths novelty into larger processes we are 
already familiar with, so that it no longer appears as shock, rupture, and 
unprecedented. On the other hand, it is equally true that societal mobilization by 
pointing at threats to humanity – unified precisely by the threat itself – has another 
political dimension that is prone to treacherous misuse. Critics who warn for such 
misuse of speaking on behalf of an undifferentiated humankind (Malm and 
Hornborg, 2014; Bonneuil and Fressoz, 2016; Cohen and Colebrook, 2017) are of 
course right that this may have a depoliticizing effect. But as such depoliticization 
is of course a political act, we may just as well it the politics of depoliticization. 
I think that both political dimensions – the politics of narrative 
domestication and the politics of depoliticization – are equally important. The 
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main difference is, however, that whereas the former we are yet to explore, latter 
we have studied extensively and understand very well. Fears of depoliticization 
concern politics and the domain of the political as we know it and as we knew it 
throughout Western modernity. The anxiety grows out of the prospect that new 
and unfamiliar concepts, notions and ideas of an emerging scientific vocabulary 
re-introduce wrongdoings and injustices we know from the past by bracketing the 
political. Oddly enough, such anxiety about depoliticization is the primary source 
of the politics of narrative domestication, as it typically entails a habitual recourse 
to already established and standardized categories of both politics and humanities 
and social scientific scholarship. Projecting older categories over whatever novelty 
we conceive of is, however, the cornerstone of domestication inasmuch as it 
enables narrating the new in terms of the old. This operation, I believe, may easily 
prove to be an obstacle to affirming the necessity of a novel kind of politics of the 
Anthropocene for which categories are yet to be developed. 
In light of the familiar categories of the humanities and social sciences it 
may seem that the humanity under threat is a notion that has already been 
deconstructed in the last decades. But it must equally be clear that this humanity 
under threat has not much to do with humanity as the universal subject expected 
to come to the happy fulfillment of its inherent capacities over the course of a 
developmental historical process – the notion of humanity targeted by humanities 
and social scientific criticism in the last decades. True enough, humanity under 
threat is a universal category, but it represents a new kind of universalism (a 
zoecentric one, according to Chakrabarty) that we fail even to attempt to 
understand if we simply condemn and deprecate the occurrence of familiar words 
– humankind or humanity – without making efforts to track the shifting meanings 
these words have achieved in a presently emerging and largely unfamiliar 
scientific and transdisciplinary discourse. 
 What this means is that, on the one hand, I wholeheartedly agree with 
Chakrabarty (2018: 29) that the task today with respect to the political is to 
‘reconfigure’ it. And there is, in fact, no shortage of proposals and discussions 
concerning the potential kinds of politics to pursue (Biermann, 2014; Clark, 2014; 
Dalby, 2014; Purdy, 2015; Delanty and Mota, 2017). On the other hand, however, 
I am more skeptical about whether Chakrabarty’s argument for the necessity of 
developing Anthropocene stories that meaningfully entangle world histories and 
Earth histories, historical time and geological time, homocentric and zoecentric 
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worldviews, can succeed in such reconfiguration. True enough, these stories 
reconfigure the scale of political thinking and the role of the human with respect 
both to interspecies and intraspecies justice. But the extent to which they 
necessarily remain stories assigns them a political function that has been tailored 
to pre-Anthropocene concerns. 
A politics for the Anthropocene, I believe, rather begins with the realization 
that storytelling domesticates the Anthropocene predicament. All this does not 
mean that Chakrabarty and Anthropocene storytellers are completely wrong 
about the necessity of Anthropocene narratives. Narrative domestication as a 
vehicle of understanding may remain indispensable for many reasons. Nor does 
this mean that critics of the notion of the Anthropocene, pointing at the 
undifferentiated mentions of the word humanity, are completely wrong. The most 
striking feature of recent Anthropocene discussions is precisely that most of the 
participants seem to be right in one way or another, despite the fact that their ways 
of understanding oftentimes conflict and contradict each other. This precisely is 
the case with the telling Anthropocene stories on the one hand and recognizing 
the shock and the unprecedented change of the Anthropocene on the other. We 
need to learn how to navigate carefully among potentially conflicting but equally 
compelling imperatives by exploring the extent to which each and every one of 
them may function as both vehicles and obstacles of understanding the 
Anthropocene predicament. 
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Notes 
1. Alternative proposals to date the Anthropocene vary from the domestication of 
animals to the postwar period. As a brief sample, see Smith and Zeder (2013), 
Lewis and Maslin (2015), and Steffen et al. (2015). 
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2. It must be clear that the renegotiation of the nature-human divide does not mean 
a complete erasure of the distinction. It rather means an existential bond between 
the two which still remain, in many contexts, distinguishable. Nevertheless, Malm 
(2018) has recently argued for the necessity of retaining the distinction in order to 
be able to act. See also Hornborg (2017) arguing against a tendency in recent 
(post)humanities scholarship to abolish analytical distinctions. 
3. Many eminent historians engaged critically with White’s position in the 1990s 
(Himmelfarb, 1992; Marwick, 1995; Ginzburg, 2012: 165–179). For an overview of 
White’s reception see Vann (1998). 
4. For retrospective assessments of narrativism in history see Partner (2009) and 
Rigney (2013). 
5. The statement is available at https://www.historians.org/jobs-and-professional-
development/statements-standards-and-guidelines-of-the-discipline/statement-
on-standards-of-professional-conduct 
6. Bonneuil and Fressoz are of course not alone in thinking that there is one grand 
scientific Anthropocene story. Arguments for the necessity of humanities’ and 
social sciences’ viewpoints in a wider debate typically deploy the trope. See, for 
instance, Lövbrand et al. (2015); for a counter-argument see Thomas (2018). 
7. The distinction between homocentric and zoecentric worldviews corresponds to the 
more recent distinction of Chakrabarty (2018: 22–29) between human-centered 
and planet-centered ways of thinking. 
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